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This paper provides an extension of general equilibrium theory that incor-
porates the actions of individuals both as demanders and suppliers of goods
and as members of …rms, schools, social groups, and contractual relation-
ships. The central notion of the paper is a group: a collection of individuals
associated with one another for some purpose. The model takes as primitive
an exogenous set of group types, interpretable as (potential) …rms, schools,
social groups, contracts etc. The types of schools and …rms that materialize
in equilibrium, as well as the way that agents acquire skills, are determined
endogenously in a competitive market, as are the contracts they enter into,
and the production and consumption of private commodities. The model is
well-founded (equilibrium exists) and passes a basic test of perfect competi-
tion (coincidence of the core with the set of equilibrium states). Examples
and Applications illustrate the ‡exibility and power of the framework.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the usual general equilibrium model, individuals interact with the market
but not with each other. In this paper we develop a model in which individ-
uals interact both with the market and with each other — in …rms, schools,
social groups, and contractual relationships.
The central notion of this paper is a group: a collection of individuals who
interact with one another for some purpose. (We could also call a group a
relationship or an organization.) A group is determined by the characteristics
of its members, by the inputs it uses and the outputs it produces, by the
services it provides to its members, its infrastructure, and its governance
or organizational structure. Some groups are productive (…rms), some are
educational (schools), some are social, some are contractual, and some have
all of these aspects. Individuals typically belong to many groups.
In our model, there are two broad classes of commodity: the standard
commodities of general equilibrium theory (private goods for short) and mem-
berships in groups. Both private goods and group memberships enter into
preferences, are objects of choice, and are priced. Private goods (but not
group memberships) may be used as inputs or produced as outputs by a
group. Within a group, memberships are distinguished by their membership
characteristic. The prices of memberships within a group may be interpreted
as the sharing of costs and revenues and as transfers among members. At
equilibrium, the markets for private goods clear, taking into account the
inputs and outputs of the groups that form, and membership choices are
consistent across the population.
With standard assumptions (including a continuum of agents), equilib-
rium exists and passes a test of perfect competition (coincidence of core
states and equilibrium states). The patterns of consumption and groups
that emerge — the …rms, schools, organizations and social and contractual
relationships that form — are determined endogenously in a competitive
market.
The model presented here modi…es the clubs model presented in Ellickson,
Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame (1999) in two ways:
² We allow groups to produce outputs of standard commodities.
1² Characteristics are associated with memberships, not individuals, and
we allow for joint restrictions on choices of private goods and group
memberships.
The …rst modi…cation allows us to model the production of physical out-
puts. Groups can also produce services, but a service is not a standard
commodity, and hence not an output of the group. The second modi…cation
allows much more ‡exibility in how we interpret memberships and groups.
Characteristics can describe both roles within groups and attributes of indi-
viduals required to …ll those roles. These attributes can be either acquired
or innate.
The changes to the formal model required to accommodate these exten-
sions are quite modest. The …rst change requires only that we replace the
input vector of our earlier model with an input-output vector. The second
change requires only that we drop the assumption in our earlier model that
agents must have the same characteristic in every group to which they be-
long, instead allowing agents to choose di¤erent membership characteristics
in di¤erent groups.
Although the modi…cations to the formal structure are modest, they
greatly extend the scope of our framework. Groups and memberships can be
interpreted in many ways. When the group is a “…rm” it is natural to in-
terpret members as “workers” or “supervisors,” according to their roles, and
to interpret (negative) prices for memberships as “wages.” When the group
is a “school” it is natural to interpret members as “teachers” or “students”
and to interpret (negative) prices for teacher memberships as “salaries” and
(positive) prices for student memberships as “tuition.” When the group is a
service, it is natural to interpret members as either “providers” or “clients”
and to interpret prices as “fees”, which are negative for providers and positive
for clients. In all these situations, membership prices will re‡ect the market
values of the inputs used and outputs produced, but membership prices will
also re‡ect externalities within the group. As we stress below, …rms that of-
fer disagreeable working conditions or uncongenial co-workers will be forced
to pay higher wages in order to attract employees. The examples and ap-
plications we present in Section 5 illustrate these and other instances of our
model.
Membership characteristics embody both roles in groups and the skills
2necessary to qualify for (ful…ll) those roles. Some skills are innate, and others
must be learned – in private study, in schools, or in apprenticeships. We
model learning as the ways agents qualify for memberships. For example, for
skills that are not innate:
² Agents can qualify for a membership by consuming certain standard
goods such as a home computer or a textbook. (The same idea is illus-
trated in the capitalist example of Section 6.3 in which the capitalist
member must bring capital to the group.)
² Agents can qualify for a membership by choosing other memberships
such as attending school or serving an apprenticeship.
These possibilities are built into consumption sets. Consumption sets
will typically di¤er across agents to re‡ect di¤erent capabilities to qualify for
memberships, and for some agents some memberships may be simply beyond
their reach.
There is no standard model of learning in general equilibrium theory, so
we cannot compare our model of learning to a standard model. However
there is a standard model of production (see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston and Green (1995)), and we should say something about what sets our
treatment apart.
² In the standard model the set of …rms is given exogenously. In our
model, it is the set of …rm types that is given exogenously. Whether
or not …rms of a speci…ed type actually form will be determined in
equilibrium.
² In the standard model, labor is a commodity that is priced just like any
other commodity. In our model, labor is a membership in a …rm, corre-
sponding to a particular role or skill, and labor’s reward is determined
just like the price of any other group membership.
² In the standard model, there is no sense in which workers care about
working conditions. In our model, members of a group might care
about every aspect of the group environment.
3As in our (1999) paper, the economies considered here have a continuum
of agents. This framework handles smoothly the di¢culties that arise because
club memberships are indivisible and because membership choices must be
consistent across the population. For instance, if a type of …rm requires two
programmers and a lawyer, then there must be twice as many agents who
choose to be programmers in that type of …rm as agents who choose to be
lawyers in that type of …rm. The consistency problem must be solved in a
context where agents can belong to many groups, as may be necessary for
acquiring skills in some groups and using those skills in other groups.
Our main formal results are that equilibrium exists, that equilibrium
states belong to the core, and that core states can be decentralized by prices
(core equivalence). Because the present model is closely related to our earlier
model, the proofs of these results require only small changes from the proofs
of the corresponding results in our (1999) paper, and so are omitted. (For
economies with a …nite number of agents, the techniques of Ellickson, Grodal,
Scotchmer and Zame (2001) could be adapted to prove that approximate
equilibria exist, that approximate equilibrium states belong to the core, and
that approximate core states can be approximately decentralized by prices.)
We view the framework — rather than the theorems or the proofs — as the
most important contribution of the present paper.
The theory we develop has some features in common with the competitive
theory of labor management set forth by Keiding (1973) and Drèze (1989),
and with the cooperative theory of coalition production, for which Ichiishi
(1993) is representative, but there are many important di¤erences. As do we,
Keiding (1973) works in a continuum model and accommodates di¤erentiated
labor skills. However, in Keiding’s model, labor skills are given exogenously
and …xed, rather than acquired. Further, there is only a single “…rm” (in
the sense that agents have access to a single production technology), and
agents do not care about the composition of this …rm but only about what
fraction of their labor endowment to deliver to the …rm. There is no match-
ing problem. Private goods are traded in competitive markets and labor is
supplied cooperatively, but in equilibrium, it is “as if” there are competitive
prices for the non-marketed labor services. In Drèze (1989), labor skills are
di¤erentiated, and each group of agents has access to an exogenously given
production set, but agents do not care about the composition of the …rms
in which they work, and again there is no matching problem. In Ichiishi
(1993), the production possibilities for each set of agents are given exoge-
4nously — not determined endogenously as in our model — and again, there
is no matching problem.
Several other papers bear a closer relationship to the present paper.
Makowski (1978) interprets clubs as organizations formed by entrepreneurs.
Cole and Prescott (1996) provides an integration of club theory and general
equilibrium theory, which accomplishes some of the same things as our (1999)
paper, but their approach is to view the objects of choice as divisible lotteries
over club memberships and consumption bundles, rather than as indivisible
club memberships and divisible consumption bundles. Closest in spirit is
Prescott and Townsend (2001), which views clubs as productive units and
focuses on moral hazard.
In Section 2 we preview our model with a whimsical example. The model
is presented in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the main Theorems. Section
5 presents examples that show some of the power of our model. The …rst
example, which formalizes the whimsical example of Section 2, shows how
learning can be modeled through apprenticeship, and how groups can be in-
terpreted as …rms producing services. The second example, which concerns
the transition in the industrial revolution from home production to factory
production during the industrial revolution, shows how agents’ preferences
over working conditions in‡uence the nature of equilibrium. The third ex-
ample, which builds on the second, shows how our model can be used to
articulate the organization of the …rm. The fourth example shows how con-
tractual issues can be represented in our framework and how competition
in‡uences the contracts chosen in equilibrium.
52 A Venetian Holiday
A whimsical example may help the reader understand the formal model to
come. Consider trips on a Venetian gondola. Each trip requires the services
of two gondoliers: one in the front, and one in the back. Each trip can
accommodate two passengers: one in the front and one in the back. (For
simplicity we assume that trips actually require two passengers, although it
is certainly possible to imagine trips with a single passenger, or even none.)
The trip may promise silence or it may promise singing by the rear gondolier.
Trips may take place in the morning or in the afternoon.
To code gondola rides as groups in our framework, we must specify inputs
and outputs, and characteristics of the memberships of each group. In the
present context, the input is the use of a gondola, and there is no output
(because we code the gondola ride as part of the description of the group).
We distinguish 4 group types: the …rst consists of a front and a rear gondolier
and a front and a rear passenger, with a speci…cation that the trip will take
place in the morning and promise silence; the second consists of a front and
a rear gondolier and a front and a rear passenger, with a speci…cation that
the trip will take place in the morning and promise singing; the third and
fourth substitute “afternoon” for “morning.” (Note that we follow the usual
general equilibrium practice of incorporating time by dating the commodities
— or services in this case.) In the …rst and the third group type there
are the same family of membership characteristics: front passenger, rear
passenger, front gondolier, and rear gondolier. In the second and fourth group
type the membership characteristics are front passenger, rear passenger, front
gondolier, and rear singing gondolier
Hence we in total have 5 membership characteristics. Using obvious no-
tation, we write gm;gsm;ga;gsafor the 4 group types (writing gsa to rep-
resent a gondola ride, with singing, in the afternoon, and so forth) and we





Note that these 16 kinds of memberships are distinct: front and rear gon-
6doliers have di¤erent responsibilities, front and rear passengers have di¤er-
ent views of the scenery, gondoliers and/or passengers may prefer silence or
singing, afternoons are di¤erent from mornings. In our framework, member-
ships are objects of choice and are priced, and these 16 memberships might
all have di¤erent prices.
To this point, we have said nothing about the feasibility of choices for
various individuals. It is probably true that no special ability is required
of passengers — apart from their physical presence in Venice — but some
special ability is surely required of gondoliers. (It might even be that dif-
ferent abilities are required of front and rear gondoliers, a possibility we
ignore here.) We might therefore imagine that society consists of two sub-
populations: Venetians, who are born knowing how to operate a gondola (or
have acquired that skill before our story opens), and Tourists, who do not
have and cannot acquire that skill. Our formalization of this distinction is
that consumption sets of Tourists allow the choice of passenger memberships
but not of gondolier memberships, while consumption sets of Venetians allow
the choice of gondolier memberships but not of passenger memberships.1
Of course, some additional special ability is also required to sing. Perhaps
a class of Venetians is born with this ability (or have acquired that skill
before our story opens), another class is not born with it but can acquire it
by serving as the front gondolier on a singing trip, and yet a third class is
not born with it and cannot acquire it. Our formalization is again in terms
of consumption sets. For members of the …rst class, consumption sets allow
either gondolier choice. For members of the third class, consumption sets do
not allow choice of either (RGS;gsm) or (RGS;gsa): a non-singing Venetian
cannot make a choice that requires singing. For members of the second class,
the consumption set precludes the choice (RGS;gsm) and only allows the
choice (RGS;gsa) in conjunction with the choice (FG;gsm):a V e n e t i a n
who is not born with the ability to sing cannot make a choice that requires
singing in the morning, and can only make a choice that requires singing in
the afternoon if s/he acquires, in the morning, the ability to sing.
In our equilibrium notion, the 16 kinds of memberships in gondola rides
are priced, and agents optimize given these prices The equilibrium conditions
require that prices within each type of group must sum to the cost of inputs,
1For simplicity, we assume that Venetians cannot choose to be passengers rather than
gondoliers.
7and that membership choices are consistent across the population. (In par-
ticular, equal numbers of Tourists (respectively, Venetians) choose front and
rear memberships in the morning, and so forth.) It is natural to guess that,
at equilibrium, passengers pay positive prices, gondoliers pay negative prices
(that is, gondoliers are paid by the passengers), and these prices generate
a net surplus that exactly covers the cost of the gondola. We verify these
guesses in Section 5.1 below.
83 General Equilibrium with Groups
We …rst extend our (1999) club model so that it applies to many di¤erent
organizations: …rms, contracts, social clubs, schools, etc. Instead of the terms
club types and clubs used in the previous paper, we use here the terms group
types and groups.
3.1 Private Goods
There are N ¸ 1 divisible, publicly traded private goods. Although we
allow all kinds of private goods, we typically have physical goods in mind,
rather than labor or other services, because we typically model these in the
description of group types.
3.2 Groups and Memberships
Groups are described by an exogenous set of group types.T o d e … n e g r o u p
types, we begin with …nite sets ­ of membership characteristics and ¡ of
organizational characteristics.Agroup type is a triple (¼;°;y) consisting of
a pro…le ¼ : ­ ! Z+ = f0;1;:::g, an organizational characteristic ° 2 ¡,
and an input-output vector y 2 R
N. We take as given a …nite set of possible
group types G = f(¼;°;y)g.
As usual, we interpret negative components of y as inputs and positive
components of y as outputs. We allow for the possibility that y<0 (so
that group formation requires inputs but produces no outputs, which would
typically be the case for a group whose purpose is to provide a service) and
for the possibility that y>0 (so that production requires only the e¤orts
of the members). For ! 2 ­, ¼(!) represents the number of members with
the membership characteristic ! that the group is required to have, and so
j¼j =
P
!2­¼(!) is the total number of members that the group is required
to have.
A membership characteristic might be anything that matters to the in-
dividuals who comprise a group or to the activity in which the group is
engaged. In particular, a membership characteristic can encompass personal
9qualities (intelligence, appearance, personality, etc.), roles within the group
(teacher, student, supervisor, skilled laborer, unskilled laborer, etc.) and
skills (singing, dancing, language, etc.). Formally, all membership charac-
teristics are acquired; membership characteristics that are innate (height for
instance) are encompassed in our speci…cation of consumption sets below.
Importantly, membership characteristics are observable and contractible. We
emphasize that ­ is simply an abstract …nite set. In particular, ­ is not a
vector space and need not have any linear structure.
An organizational characteristic might be anything that matters to the
potential member of a group apart from the characteristics of the members
in the group and the input-output vector. In particular, an organizational
characteristic can encompass the activity within the group (that is, the pro-
cess used to produce output), the organizational hierarchy within the group,
and the duties of each potential member of the group.2
A membership is an opening in a particular group type corresponding to
a particular membership characteristic. Formally, a membership is a pair
m =( !;(¼;°;y)) such that (¼;°;y) 2Gand ¼(!) ¸ 1.W ew r i t eM for the
set of memberships; because the set G of group types is …nite so is the set
M of memberships.
Each agent may choose many memberships or none. A membership list
is a function ` : M!f 0;1;:::g; `(m) speci…es the number of memberships
of type m =( !;(¼;°;y)).W r i t eLists for the set of lists.
3.3 Agents
The set of agents is a nonatomic …nite measure space (A;F;¸).T h a ti s ,A
is a set, F is a ¾-algebra of subsets of A,a n d¸ is a non-atomic measure on
F with ¸(A) < 1.
A complete description of an agent a 2 A consists of a consumption
set, an endowment vector of private goods and a utility function. Agent a’s
consumption set Xa speci…es the feasible pairs of bundles of private goods
2We could probably dispense with organizational characteristics, coding everything into
membership characteristics. However, distinguishing the characteristics of the organization
from the characteristics of its members seems quite natural in applications, so we have
chosen to build the distinction into the theory.
10and lists of memberships that the agent may choose. We assume that Xa has
the following properties:
² Xa ½ R
N
+ £ Lists
² if (xa;¹ a) 2 Xa and x0
a ¸ xa then (x0
a;¹ a) 2 Xa




The …rst two requirements are familiar: private good consumption must
be non-negative, and increased consumption of private goods is always pos-
sible. The last assumption provides a bound on the number of memberships
that each agent can choose. In particular, for each agent a 2 A the set
Listsa = f¹a 2 Lists : there exists xa 2 R
N
+ s.t. (xa;¹ a) 2 Xag
is …nite.
Ac h o i c e(xa;¹ a) is in Xa if it is possible for agent a to consume the
bundle of private goods xa and ful…ll the requirements of the memberships
speci…ed by ¹a. The consumption set Xa encodes restrictions on the choices
that a can make with respect to both private goods and memberships. For
instance, we encode the information that a is short (and that this condition is
immutable) by insisting that if (xa;¹ a) 2 Xa then ¹a(!;g)=0whenever the
characteristic ! includes being tall. We encode the information that b cannot
read (but that this condition is remediable) by insisting that if (xb;¹ b) 2 Xb
and ¹b(!;g) > 0 for some characteristic ! that includes being able to read
then ¹b(!0;g 0) > 0 for some membership (!0;g0) that teaches b to read. And
we encode the information that c must own a violin to be concertmaster
of an orchestra by insisting that if (xc;¹ c) 2 Xc and ¹c(!;g) > 0 for a
concertmaster membership then xc includes at least 1 violin. For this reason,
we do not assume that Xa = R
N
+ £ Listsa.
Much of the ‡exibility of our model arises from the fact that an agent
can choose (memberships with) di¤erent characteristics in di¤erent groups.
In particular, we allow an agent to …ll di¤erent roles in di¤erent groups —
to provide barber services in one group and receive them in another. The
11possibility of …lling di¤erent roles in di¤erent groups is essential to the way we
model the acquisition of skills, which will typically be acquired in one venue
and applied in another. Of course, the acquisition of skills usually precedes
their application; we incorporate the temporal element by viewing the date
or time period as part of the description of a group, just as traditional general
equilibrium theory frequently views the date or time period as part of the
description of a commodity.
Agent a’s endowment is (ea;0) 2 Xa. Note that agents are endowed with
private goods but not with group memberships, and that survival without
group memberships is possible.
Agent a’s utility function ua : Xa ! R is de…ned over private goods
consumptions and lists of group membership. We assume throughout that,
for each ¹a 2 Lists
ua(¢;¹ a):fxaj(xa;¹ a) 2 Xag!R
is continuous and strictly monotone; i.e., utility is strictly increasing in con-
sumption of private goods. We make no assumptions about the way in which
utility depends on the choice of group memberships.
3.4 Economies
An economy E is a mapping a 7! (Xa;e a;u a) for which:
² the consumption set correspondence a 7! Xa is a measurable corre-
spondence
² the endowment mapping a 7! ea is an integrable function
² the utility mapping (a;x;`) 7! ua(x;`) is a jointly measurable function
of its arguments
For convenience, we will sometimes make the simplifying assumption that
the aggregate endowment ¹ e =
R
A ea d¸(a) is strictly positive, so all private
goods are represented in the aggregate. (Admittedly, this is not a very sat-
isfactory assumption in a production economy.)
123.5 States




A state speci…es choices of private goods and of group memberships for each
agent. Feasibility of a state of the economy is de…ned as feasibility of the
consumption and production plans and consistent matching of agents.
It is convenient to de…ne consistent matching of agents in terms of the
aggregate of choices. To this end, de…ne an aggregate membership vector to
be an element ¹ ¹ 2 RM. An aggregate membership vector ¹ ¹ is consistent if
for every group type (¼;°;y) 2G ,t h e r ei sar e a ln u m b e r®(¼;°;y) such that
¹ ¹(!;(¼;°;y)) = ®(¼;°;y)¼(!)
for each ! 2 ­. Given a measurable set B ½ A and a measurable choice
function ¹ : B ! Lists,w es a yt h a t¹ is consistent for B if the aggregate
membership vector
R
B ¹a d¸(a) is consistent.3
The state (x;¹) is feasible for the measurable subset B ½ A if
(i) Individual feasibility





















B ¹a d¸(a) is consistent for B.
3Consistency means that the proportions of agents choosing a particular membership
in a particular group type are the same as the proportions speci…ed in the group type. For
detailed discussion of why this is the appropriate formalization of consistent matching of
agents, see our (1999) and (2001) papers.
13That is, (x;¹) is feasible for B if individuals choose in their consumption
sets, private consumption does not exceed the sum of endowments and net
production, and agents are matched consistently. The state (x;¹) is feasible if
it is feasible for the set A itself. If (x;¹) is a state of the economy, m =( !;g)
is a membership and ¹a(m) > 0,w es a ya chooses the membership m.
If (x;¹) is consistent for B and
R
B ¹a d¸(a)=®(¼;°;y)¼(!) for each










Because members of a group care only about the membership characteristics
of other members, and not about their identities, it is not necessary to identify
the agents belonging to each individual group.
3.6 Group Equilibrium
Both private goods and group memberships are priced, so prices (p;q) lie in
R
N £ R
M; p is the vector of prices for private goods and q is the vector of
prices for group memberships. Because utility functions are assumed mono-
tone in private goods, private goods prices will be positive in equilibrium,
but prices of group memberships may be positive, negative or zero. Because
am e m b e r s h i ps p e c i … e sb o t hag r o u pt y p ea n dam e m b e r s h i pc h a r a c t e r i s -
tic, membership prices depend both on the group type and the membership
characteristic.
A group equilibrium consists of prices (p;q) 2 R
N
+ £ R
M with p 6=0and
a feasible state (x;¹) such that
(1) Budget balance for group types For each (¼;°;y) 2G :
X
!2­
¼(!) q(!;(¼;°;y)) + p ¢ y =0
(2) Budget feasibility for agents For almost all a 2 A:
(p;q) ¢ (xa;¹ a) · p ¢ ea














Thus, at an equilibrium the sum of membership prices in a given group
type just balances the value of the input-output vector, and individuals opti-
mize subject to their budget constraints. (Recall that feasibility of the state
(x;¹) already entails material balance.) A group quasi-equilibrium satis…es
(1), (2) and the weaker condition













a) ¸ p ¢ ea
As usual, the di¤erence between equilibrium and a quasi-equilibrium is
that at the latter agents do not necessarily optimize in their budget sets
but only choose consumption bundles that are not dominated by any con-
sumption bundle that costs strictly less than their wealth. Evidently every
equilibrium is a quasi-equilibrium; we give conditions in Section 4 that guar-
antee that every quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium.
3.7 Pricing Relevant Characteristics
The description of a membership in a group is very detailed: it includes the
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c so ft h eg i v e nm e m b e r s h i pa n do ft h eo t h e rm e m b e r s h i p si nt h e
group, the purpose and organization of the group, and the input-output vec-
tor. Because we allow individuals to care about all these aspects, we must
allow prices to depend on all these aspects as well; if we did not, we could
easily …nd examples in which some core states could not be decentralized by
prices and indeed in which equilibrium did not exist. However, in certain
circumstances, it may happen that some aspects of membership are irrele-
vant to agents in the economy, and in those circumstance we can conclude
that prices do not distinguish between such aspects. Indeed, if, in equilib-
rium, there is a set of positive measure of agents, each of whom chooses (in
equilibrium) the membership m and …nds the membership m0 to be a perfect
substitute for m,t h e nm0 must be at least as expensive as m: q(m0) ¸ q(m).
15And if there is also a set of positive measure of agents, each of whom chooses
the membership m0 and …nds the membership m to be a perfect substitute
for m0,t h e nm;m0 m u s th a v et h es a m ep r i c e :q(m0)=q(m).
The pricing of irrelevant aspects highlights one of the distinctions be-
tween the present framework, in which memberships chosen by a particular
individual may display di¤erent characteristics in di¤erent groups, and the
framework in our (1999) paper, in which individuals bring the same charac-
teristics to each group to which they belong. As a consequence, in our earlier
framework irrelevant aspects of an individual may seem relevant to member-
ship prices, when in fact they are not. Our present framework facilitates a
much more direct connection between membership prices and the attributes
of memberships that matter.
To illustrate, consider writing a paper with two coauthors, one Danish
and the other English, and imagine the only thing that matters is that both
authors speak the same language. In the present framework, we need only
consider two types of group, d (Danish-speaking) and e (English-speaking),
and two types of membership, D (Danish-speaking) and E (English speak-
ing). Assuming coauthorship requires no inputs, we would, with the ob-
vious notation, identify the group types as ((D;D);d;0), ((E;E);e;0) and
the memberships as (D;((D;D);d;0)), (E;((E;E);e;0)). In the framework
of our (1999) paper, however, we must formally distinguish individuals who
speak both Danish and English from individuals who speak only one language
or the other, and must then consider six kinds of partnership and eight kinds
of membership; with the obvious notation the partnerships would be
((D;D);d;0) ((E;E);e;0) ((DE;D);d;0)
((DE;E);e;0)) ((DE;DE);d;0)) ((DE;DE);e;0)




Of course, if there are eight kinds of memberships there must formally be
eight membership prices. However, if no one cares whether their partner
16can speak two languages, many of these memberships will be perfect sub-
stitutes and the corresponding equilibrium membership prices will coincide:
q(DE;((DE;D);d;0)) = q(D;((D;D);d;0)) (assuming both partnerships
are chosen in equilibrium), etc.
174T h e o r e m s
We say the feasible state (x;¹) is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible state
(x0;¹ 0) such that ua(x0
a;¹ 0
a) >u a(xa;¹ a) for almost every a 2 A;w es a y
(x;¹) is strongly Pareto optimal if there is no feasible state (x0;¹ 0) such that
ua(x0
a;¹ 0
a) ¸ ua(xa;¹ a) for almost every a 2 A and ub(x0
b;¹ 0
b) >u b(xb;¹ b) for
all b in some subset B ½ A of positive measure. Similarly, we say the feasible
state (x;¹) is in the core if there is no subset B ½ A of positive measure
and state (x0;¹ 0) that is feasible for B such that ub(x0
b;¹ 0
b) >u b(xb;¹ b) for
almost every b 2 B;w es a y(x;¹) is in the strong core if there is no subset
B ½ A of positive measure and state (x0;¹ 0) that is feasible for B such that
ub(x0
b;¹ 0
b) ¸ ub(xb;¹ b) for almost every b 2 B and uc(x0
c;¹ 0
c) >u c(xc;¹ c) for
every c in some subset C ½ B of positive measure.
Of course the Pareto set contains the strong Pareto set and the core
contains the strong core. For pure exchange economies in which consumption
sets are the positive orthant and preferences are strictly monotone, the Pareto
set and strong Pareto set coincide and the core and strong core coincide. In
our context, however, the strong Pareto set may be a proper subset of the
Pareto set and the strong core may be a proper subset of the core.4 However
a natural assumption provides a simple way around this problem.
Say that endowments are desirable if for every agent a and every con-
sumption choice (xa;¹ a) 2 Xa for which ua(xa;¹ a) >u a(ea;0), there exists
x0
a · xa;x 0
a 6= xa such that (x0
a;¹ a) 2 Xa.5
Proposition 4.1 If endowments are desirable then the strong Pareto set co-
incides with the Pareto set and the strong core coincides with the core.
4In the exchange case, the arguments for equality of the Pareto set and strong Pareto
set, and for equality of the core and strong core, are familiar. The essential point is that
if we are given allocations x;x0 such that x is weakly preferred to x by some set of agents
and strictly preferred by some subset of these agents, then we can tax the latter agents
and redistribute the proceeds, obtaining an allocation x00 that is strictly preferred to x by
a l la g e n t si nt h es e t .I no u rc o n t e x t ,h o w e v e r ,g i v e ns t a t e s(x;¹);(x0;¹ 0) such that (x0;¹ 0)
is weakly preferred to (x;¹) by some set of agents and strictly preferred by some subset
of those agents, we may …nd that in the state (x0;¹ 0) the latter group of agents consumer
no private goods — or consume a bundle that is minimal in their consumption set, given
the group membership choices — and hence cannot be taxed.
5The reader familiar with our (1999) paper will note that we have adapted this de…nition
to allow general consumption sets.
18The First Welfare Theorem follows by the usual straightforward argument
(but the Second Welfare Theorem may fail; see our (1999) paper).
Theorem 4.1 Every group equilibrium state belongs to the core and in par-
ticular is Pareto optimal. If endowments are desirable then every group equi-
librium state belongs to the strong core and in particular is strongly Pareto
optimal.
As in the exchange case, a quasi-equilibrium (x;¹) need not be an equi-
librium if a positive measure set of agents B are in the minimum expenditure
situation. (That is, for agents b 2 B there is no bundle of private commodi-
ties x0
b such that x0
b · xb;x 0
b 6= xb and (x0
b;¹ b) 2 Xb.) In the exchange case,
irreducibility rules out this possibility; a similarly-motivated condition will
rule it out in our setting also.
Let E be a group economy and let (x;¹) be a feasible state. Let I ½
f1;¢¢¢;Ng be a non-empty set of private goods. Say that the feasible state
(x;¹) is a minimum consumption con…guration for good i if for almost all
agents a 2 A there does not exist a bundle x0
a of private goods such that
x0
a · xa;x 0
ai <x ai and (x0
a;¹ a) 2 Xa.( I f(0;¹ a) 2 Xa then a feasible state
is a minimum consumption …guration for good i only if the entire social
endowment of i is used in group formation.) Say that (x;¹) is group linked
if for every partition f1;¢¢¢;Ng = I [J of the set of consumption goods for
which (x;¹) is a minimum expenditure con…guration for each good i 2 I,
then for almost every a 2 A there is a real number r 2 R a n da ni n d e xj 2 J
such that
ua(ea + r±j;0) >u a(xa;¹ a)
(As usual, we write ±j for the consumption bundle consisting of one unit of
the private good j and nothing else.) We say that E is group irreducible if
every feasible allocation is group linked.6
Proposition 4.2 If E is group irreducible then every quasi-equilibrium is an
equilibrium.
6The reader familiar with our (1999) paper will note that we have adapted the def-
initions of club linked and club irreducible to take into account that we allow general
consumption sets.
19In our continuum framework, equilibrium exists and passes a familiar test
of perfect competition: coincidence of the core with the set of equilibrium
states.
Theorem 4.2 If E is group irreducible and endowments are desirable and
uniformly bounded above then it admits a group equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3 If E is group irreducible and endowments are desirable and
uniformly bounded above then the core coincides with the set of group equi-
librium states.
The (omitted) proofs of these results follow closely the proofs of the corre-
sponding results in our (1999) paper; the only changes necessary are the very
minor ones necessary to incorporate the small di¤erences in formal structures.
² In our earlier work we allow for inputs to group formation; here we
allow for inputs and outputs. This di¤erence requires only that we
extend our accounting to keep track of inputs and outputs.
² In our earlier work we insist that consumption sets be of the form
Xa = RL £ Listsa; here we allow for general consumption sets. This
di¤erence requires only that we be more careful about the distinction
between quasi-equilibrium and equilibrium.
² In our earlier work we insist that agents choose only memberships corre-
sponding to a particular (given and immutable) external characteristic;
here the characteristics are attached to the memberships instead of to
the agents, and the agents are allowed to assume di¤erent character-
istics in di¤erent groups. However, aside from allowing more general
consumption sets, this di¤erence requires no changes in the argument.
205 Examples and Applications
In this Section, we give a series of examples to illustrate some of the ‡exibility
of our model: groups can be interpreted as apprenticeships, as …rms produc-
ing personal services that are not traded on the market, as …rms producing
physical goods that are traded on the market, or as relationships governed by
contracts — and some groups possess several of these aspects. The ‡exibility
of our model relies heavily on the possibility that an agent can belong to
several groups.
Example 5.1 elaborates our whimsical Venetian holiday (Section 2). The
example illustrates that some skills are innate but that others can be ac-
quired, and that skills can be acquired in one group (an apprenticeship, in
this case) and applied in another group. Of course, the acquisition of skills
typically precedes the application of those skills — a feature that is modeled
by dating the groups.
In Example 5.1, the groups produce services which are not traded. In
Examples 5.2 and 5.3, the groups produce physical goods which are traded.
These examples illustrate how our model of production di¤ers from the stan-
dard general equilibrium model (see our discussion in the Introduction). In
the setting considered here, which is motivated by Mokyr’s (2002) descrip-
tion of the historical shift of production from homes to factories during the
industrial revolution 1760-1830, the di¤erence is crucial because it enables
us to incorporate the tension between the unpleasantness of working condi-
tions and the productivity gains that characterized factory production. As
Example 5.2 shows, the resolution of this tension depends on parameters of
the economy: if factory production is su¢ciently more e¢cient then it may
drive out home production — but for an open set of parameters, factory
production and home production can co-exist.
Example 5.3 provides another di¤erence between our model and the stan-
dard model. In the standard model, capital is purchased on the market just
as is any other input, so there is no role for “capitalists.” Example 5.3 pro-
vides such a role by di¤erentiating between a worker-managed …rm, in which
capital is provided equally by all the members, and a capitalist-managed
…rm, in which capital is provided only by the lone capitalist. In our ex-
ample, there is again a tension between the unpleasantness of working for
a capitalist and the productivity gains possible in that organizational form.
21As before, the resolution of this tension depends on parameters of the econ-
omy: if capitalist-managed …rms are su¢ciently more e¢cient they may drive
out worker-managed …rms — but for an open set of parameters, capitalist-
managed …rms and worker-managed …rms can co-exist.
Finally, Example 5.4 shows how a group can be interpreted as a contract,
and why that is useful. Contracts are typically cast as bargaining problems,
with the in‡uence of the market appearing only in reservation payo¤s. As
this example illustrates, however, our framework permits us to analyze con-
tracting directly within a competitive environment. In particular, we show
how the terms of contracts will be determined by competitive market forces,
and contrast the competitive outcome with the outcomes possible when the
terms of contracts are determined by bargaining among the parties.
5.1 Venetian Holiday
As a simple illustration of the way our model works — especially the in-
tertemporal acquisition of skills — and of the computation of equilibrium,
we ‡esh out our whimsical example of Venetian gondola rides; see Section 2
and Subsection 3.7.
We identify 5 membership characteristics: front and rear passengers, front
and rear gondoliers, and rear gondoliers who sing: FP;RP;FG;RG;RGS.7
Similarly, we identify 4 group types: non-singing gondola trips in the morning
and afternoon, singing gondola trips in the morning and afternoon. For
simplicity, we assume gondola rides require no inputs (ignoring the necessary
gondola), so with the obvious abuse of notation we have:
gm =( ( FP;RP;FG;RG);m;0)
ga =( ( FP;RP;FG;RG);a;0)
gsm =( ( FP;RP;FG;RGS);m;0)
gsa =( ( FP;RP;FG;RGS);a;0)
Note that morning and afternoon trips are distinguished only by the organi-
7Although it seems natural to distinguish rear gondoliers who sing, it is not really
necessary, since membership in the group type which promises singing would distinguish
them equally well. This and other modeling choices are largely matters of convenience
and taste.
22zational characteristic m;a.
There are a continuum of agents, of three kinds: Tourists T,V e n e t i a n s
who can sing VS, and Venetians who cannot sing V ; with population masses
¸(T);¸(VS);¸(V ) respectively. All agents are endowed with four units of
t h es i n g l ec o n s u m p t i o ng o o d .
Tourists can choose any non-negative quantity of the private good, and
at most one gondola trip — as either a front or rear passenger — in the
morning and at most one gondola trip in the afternoon. Write
ListsT =
n
` : `(FP;gm)+`(RP;gm)+`(FP;gsm)+`(RP;gsm) · 1;
`(FP;ga)+`(RP;ga)+`(FP;gsa)+`(RP;gsa) · 1
o
so that Xt = R+ £ ListsT for each t 2 T. Tourists care about consumption
during the day, and about gondola rides; a gondola ride (as front or rear
passenger, in the morning or afternoon ) without singing doubles utility, a
gondola ride with singing quadruples utility, but additional rides are of no
value. Hence for each t 2 T and (x;`) 2 Xt:
ut(x;`)=
8
> > > <













Venetians who can sing can choose any non-negative quantity of the
private good, and can choose at most one gondola trip — as a front or rear




` : `(FG;gm)+`(RG;gm)+`(FG;gsm)+`(RGS;gsm) · 1;
`(FG;ga)+`(RG;ga)+`(FG;gsa)+`(RGS;gsa) · 1
o
so that Xv = R+ £ ListsVS for each v 2 VS.
Venetians who cannot sing can choose any non-negative quantity of
the private good, and can choose at most one gondola trip — as a front or
8Alternatively, we could allow Venetians to choose to be passengers but to derive no
utility from such a choice; this would complicate notation, but lead to the same equilibrium
outcomes.
23rear gondolier — in the morning and one in the afternoon, but cannot choose
to be a singing gondolier in the morning, and cannot choose to be a singing
gondolier in the afternoon unless they have chosen to be a front gondolier in
a singing gondola trip in the morning. Write
ListsVS =
n
` : `(FG;gm)+`(RG;gm)+`(FG;gsm)+`(RGS;gsm) · 1;
`(FG;ga)+`(RG;ga)+`(FG;gsa)+`(RGS;gsa) · 1;
`(RGS;gsm)=0 ;` (RGS;gsa) · `(FG;gsm)
o
so that Xv = R+ £ ListsV for each v 2 V .





We take 0 · A · B · C: the front of the gondolier is a less di¢cult post
than the rear, and singing is additionally onerous.
The equilibrium prices and choices will depend on the proportion of each
subpopulation and on the disutility parameters A;B;C. W ea s s u m eh e r e
that ¹(T) > 2¸(V [ VS) (which guarantees that some tourists obtain no
rides), that ¸(V ) >¸ (VS) (which guarantees that not all Venetians who
cannot sing can learn how), and that 0 · A · 1, A · B · A +1and
B · C · B+2(which guarantees that Venetians have the proper incentives
to provide singing and non-singing trips, in the morning and in the afternoon,
and to learn to sing).
To solve for equilibrium, we rely on two observations: a) in the relevant
range, this is a transferable utility economy, so the equilibrium state maxi-
mizes social welfare, and b) at equilibrium, agents who are ex ante identical
must obtain the same utility.
Taking the consumption good as numeraire, with price 1, let q be the






Some Venetians who cannot sing will not be able to learn; these Venetians
provide non-singing services in the afternoon and in the morning, in the front
or in the rear; Venetians who cannot sing but do learn provide services in
the front of a singing ride in the morning and in the rear of a singing ride in
the afternoon. All these must obtain the same utility, so:
[¡q(FG;gm) ¡ A]+[ ¡q(FG;ga) ¡ A]
=[ ¡q(FG;gm) ¡ A]+[ ¡q(FG;gsa) ¡ A]
=[ ¡q(FG;gm) ¡ A]+[ ¡q(RG;ga) ¡ B]
=[ ¡q(RG;gm) ¡ B]+[ ¡q(FG;ga) ¡ A]
=[ ¡q(RG;gm) ¡ B]+[ ¡q(FG;gsa) ¡ A]
=[ ¡q(RG;gm) ¡ B]+[ ¡q(RG;ga) ¡ B]
=[ ¡q(FG;gsm) ¡ A]+[ ¡q(RGS;gsa) ¡ C]
Some tourists obtain no rides, consume their endowments and obtain
utility 4, so all tourists obtain utility 4. Keeping in mind that tourists are




>From the equations above, a little straightforward algebra yields the

































(Our assumptions about the disutility parameters guarantee that providing
gondolier services is preferred to not working.)
Note that if B>1
3(2C + A) then q(FG;gsm) > 0: learning to sing is so
valuable that some Venetians who cannot sing are willing to work for nothing
(in the morning) and even pay for singing lessons.
5.2 The Factory System
In this application we address the rise of the factory system, using the stimu-
lating discussion in Mokyr (2002) as motivation. According to Mokyr, when
the site of production shifted from homes to factories during the industrial
revolution of 1760 –1830, the consequences for the worker were profound.
Other things equal, workers preferred working at home, but factories o¤ered
productivity gains through on-site training and team production.
We assume a continuum of agents and 2 commodities. The set of mem-
bership characteristics is ­ = fW; Mg where W represents a worker and M
a manager. There are two types of productive enterprise:
² In domestic production a …rm consists of 2 workers, each working at
home, and a manager. The group type is g1 =( ¼1;°1;y 1) where ¼1 =
(2;1) and y1 =( ¡3;3).
² In factory production a …rm consists of two workers, working in a
centralized factory, and an on-site manager. The group type is g2 =
(¼2;°2;y 2) where ¼2 =( 2 ;1) and y2 =( ¡6;®).
The 2-worker factory requires twice the input of the 2-worker …rm, 3 units
of materials (as with domestic production) and 3 units for building and equip-
26ment. Each domestic …rm produces 3 units of output; each factory produces
output ®>0. We will refer to the parameter ® as factory productivity.
All agents are ex ante identical. Each has endowment e =( k;0).W e
refer to k as the (per capita) wealth of the economy. No agent can join more
than one …rm. Preferences are described by the utility function:
u(x;`)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
8
p
x1x2 if the agent chooses no memberships
6
p
x1x2 if he chooses a membership of type (M;g1)
4
p
x1x2 if he chooses membership (W; g1) or (M;g2)
2
p
x1x2 if he chooses membership (W; g2)
Equilibrium is described by prices p1;p 2 for inputs and outputs and q for
memberships, and choices for all agents; there is no loss in normalizing so
that p1 =1 . Since agents are ex ante identical, choices can be described by
the fractions ½0 of agents choosing no membership and ½j of agents choosing
am e m b e r s h i pi na… r mo ft y p egj (j =1 ;2). We defer the calculations, and
…rst describe equilibrium.
The nature of equilibrium depends on the endowment parameter k and
the productivity parameter ®. Figure 1 which subdivides the parameter
space
f(k;®) 2 R
2 j (k;®) > 0g
into a number of regions, captures the most important features of the equi-
librium correspondence.
The curve labeled B1 is the graph of the function




Similarly, the curve labeled B2, which intersects the graph of B1 at the
point (k;®)=( 9 ;69=8), is the graph of the function
® = B2(k): =
33k ¡ 21
4k ¡ 4
k ¸ 9 (2)
(Note that B2 is de…ned only for k ¸ 9.)
Below the curve minfB1;B 2g (Regions 2 and 3), where factory produc-
tivity is low, there is no factory production: agents either engage in domestic
27Figure 1: The factory system
production or choose not to work. Above the curve B1 (Region 4), where
factory productivity is high, there is no domestic production: agents either
engage in factory production or choose not to work.
On the curve B1 (Region 1) and, for wealth k>9, in the area bounded by
the curves B1 and B2 (Region 5) domestic production and factory production
coexist. According to Mokyr, such a split between working in factories and
working at home was characteristic of most industries in which factories
appeared during the Industrial Revolution. The most detailed evidence he
presents comes from a 1906 census in France. Of workers working either in
factories or at home, the per cent working in factories varied across industries
as follows:9
² > 90 %: Chemicals, glass and pottery, iron and steel, printing, rubber
and paper.
² 80 % – 89 %: Food processing, …ne metals and jewelry, metalwork,
9See Mokyr (2002), p. 151, Table 2.
28textiles.
² 60 % – 69 %: Stone-cutting, wood and carpentry.
² 50 % – 59 %: Leather, straw and baskets.
² 30 % – 39 %: Apparel making.
Apparently even as late as the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the
tug of working in the home was still powerful enough to o¤set the advantages
of working in a factory.
To calculate equilibrium, it is convenient to work with indirect utilities.
Recalling that p1 =1 , indirect utility takes the form
v(p;q;k;!)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
V (0) := 4k=
p
p2 if no memberships
V (M;g1): =3 ( k ¡ q(M;g1))=
p
p2 if ! =( M;g1)
V (W;g1): =2 ( k ¡ q(W; g1))=
p
p2 if ! =( W;g1)
V (M;g2): =2 ( k ¡ q(M;g2))=
p
p2 if ! =( M;g2)
V (W;g2): =( k ¡ q(W:g2))=
p
p2 if ! =( W;g2)
Recall that ½0 i st h ef r a c t i o no fa g e n t sc h o o s i n gn om e m b e r s h i pa n d½j is
t h ef r a c t i o nc h o o s i n gam e m b e r s h i pi na… r mo ft y p egj (j =1 ;2). Budget
balance requires
2q(W; g1)+q(M;g1)+3 p2 ¡ 3=0 (3)
and
2q(W; g2)+q(M;g2)+®p2 ¡ 6=0 (4)





































+ ½1 +2 ½2 = k
The …rst two lines represent per capita demand by consumers and the two
terms to the left of the equality sign in the third line per capita demand for
29inputs by …rms. To the right of the equality sign is the per capita endowment
of commodity 1. Substituting ½0 + ½1 + ½2 =1and the budget-balance
equations, this market-clearing equation simpli…es to




½2 = k (5)
If ½1 > 0, then agents must be indi¤erent between working for or managing
…rms of type g1. Setting V (W; g1)=V (M;g1) implies
¡2q(W; g1)+3 q(M;g1)=k (6)
Similarly, if ½2 > 0, then equating V (W; g2)=V (M;g2) yields
¡q(W;g2)+2 q(M;g2)=k (7)
Equations 3–7 provide the main ingredients for characterizing the equi-
librium correspondence mapping the wealth-productivity parameters (k;®)
to prices
(p2;q(W;g1);q(M;g1);q(W;g2);q(M;g2))
and to the fraction ½0 of agents choosing not to work, the fraction ½1 engaging
in domestic production as a worker or manager, and the fraction ½2 engaging
in factory production as a worker or manager.
To derive the equilibrium correspondence, we begin with the case in which
½0;½ 1;½ 2 > 0: a positive fraction of agents belong to each type of …rm and
a positive fraction choose leisure. As we now show, this case corresponds to
the curve B1, the graph of equation 1, which we call Region 1. Agents are
indi¤erent between leisure, working for or managing a …rm of type g1,a n d
working for or managing a …rm of type g2.S o l v i n g
V (0) = V (W;g1)=V (M;g1)=V (W; g2)=V (M;g2)













® = B1(k): =
54 + 63k
9+7 k
which is equation 1. From the market-clearing equation 5, the ½j must satisfy
(18 + 7k)½1 +( 3 6+2 1 k)½2 =9 k
as well as ½0 + ½1 + ½2 =1 . Solving these two equations for ½1 and ½2 as
functions of ½0 yields
½1 =
12k +3 6¡ (21k + 36)½0
18 + 14k
½2 =
2k ¡ 18 + (7k +1 8 ) ½0
18 + 14k


















This characterizes the convex set of assignments (½0;½ 1;½ 2) along the curve
B1.
Below minfB1;B 2g no agents are engaged in factory production: either
all are engaged in domestic production (Region 2) or they are split between
engaging in domestic production and not working (Region 3). Suppose …rst
that all agents are engaged in domestic production: ½1 =1 ;½0 = ½2 =0 .T h e














Since V (W; g1) ¸ V (0) implies k ¸ 9, combining the inequalities above with
equation 4 implies that




31which con…rms that this case corresponds to Region 2.
Suppose instead that ½2 =0and ½0;½ 1 > 0: some agents are engaged in
domestic production and the rest choose leisure. The equalities V (W;g1)=




while the inequalities V (0) ¸ V (W;g2) and V (0) ¸ V (M;g2) imply





Combining equation 4 with the above inequalities, we conclude that
® · B1(k)
Since we must have k · 9 to rule out the preceding case, this case coincides
with Region 3. Equation 5 yields the equilibrium fraction of agents belonging




½1 increases monotonically as agent wealth k increases, reaching 1 when k =
9.
Above the curve B1, no agents are engaged in domestic production. We
consider …rst the case in which a positive fraction work or manage factories
and a positive fraction do not work: ½1 =0and ½0;½ 2 > 0. The equalities
V (W;g2)=V (M;g2)=V (0) imply
q(W; g2)=¡3kq (M;g2)=¡k
The inequalities V (W;g2) ¸ V (W; g1) and V (M;g2) ¸ V (M;g1) imply







32When factory productivity ® increases, per capita wealth k held …xed, the




so that, as per capita wealth k increases, factory employment increases. From
equation 3 and the above equalities and inequalities for prices, we conclude
this case applies if
®>B 2(k)
corresponding to Region 4 in Figure 1.
Because ½2 approaches 3/7 in the limit as k !1 ,f u l le m p l o y m e n ti n
factory production cannot occur. It is also easy to verify this directly. If











But V (W; g2)=V (M;g2) ¸ V (0) implies k ·¡ 3, which is impossible.
The …nal possibility is that agents engage simultaneously in factory and
domestic production.10 We already know this occurs along the curve B1,b u t
along that line a positive fraction of agents also choose not to work. Suppose
½0 =0but ½1;½ 2 > 0.E q u a t i n gV (W;g1)=V (M;g2) implies
q(W; g1)=q(M;g2)
Combining this equality with equations 3–7 yields
q(W;g1)=
(9 ¡ k)® ¡ 18k ¡ 54
8® ¡ 45
q(M;g1)=
(6 + 2k)® ¡ 27k ¡ 36
8® ¡ 45
q(W; g2)=
(18 ¡ 10k)® +9 k ¡ 108
8® ¡ 45
q(M;g2)=
(9 ¡ k)® ¡ 18k ¡ 54
8® ¡ 45
10There is one other logical possibility, ½0 =1and ½1 = ½2 =0 , but it is easy to show
this can never occur.






90 ¡ 45k ¡ 17® + k®
48 + 21k ¡ 9® ¡ 7k®
½2 =
¡42 + 66k +8 ® ¡ 8k®
48 + 21k ¡ 9® ¡ 7k®
The restriction 0 · ½1;½ 2 · 1 implies that k ¸ 9 and ® 2 [B1(k);B 2(k)],s o
this case corresponds to Region 5 of Figure 1.
To this point, we have assumed — as in Mokyr — that agents care about
w h e r et h e yw o r k .W h a td i ¤ e r e n c ed o e si tm a k ei fw ee l i m i n a t et h i sa s s u m p -







x1x2 if the agent chooses no memberships
6
p
x1x2 if he chooses a membership of type (M;g1) or (M;g2)
4
p
x1x2 if he chooses membership (W; g1) or (W; g2)
Utility depends on whether you are a manager or a worker, but not on
whether the productive activity takes place at home or on the factory ‡oor.
Notice that, in contrast to the preceding example, …rms acquire no inputs
from the market. Instead capital is provided by the workers (in …rms of type
g1)o rb ya ne n t r e p r e n e u r( i n… r m so ft y p eg2), an obligation we build into
consumption sets. An agent choosing a membership (W;g1) is required to
choose a nonnegative consumption vector (x1;x 2) such that x1 ¸ 1 —b u tt h e
…rst unit consumed of commodity 1 contributes nothing to utility. Similarly,
an agent choosing a membership (M;g2) must consume at least 3 units of
commodity 1, but the …rst three units contribute nothing to utility.
Many qualitative features of the equilibrium correspondence are pre-
served. Proceeding just as before leads to the phase diagram illustrated
in Figure 2. Once again the fundamental feature of the phase diagram is the
boundary de…ned by the graphs of two functions,
® = B1(k): =
( 21k+54








35As before, there is no factory production below minfB1;B 2g and no domestic
production above B1. The regions of this …gure have the same interpretation
as the corresponding regions of Figure 1, but there is now a Region 6 corre-
sponding to full employment in factory work (½2 =1 , ½0 = ½1 =0 ). (The
boundary between Regions 5 and 6 is the vertical dotted line at k =1 8 .)
Details of the equilibrium correspondence are left to the interested reader.
Nevertheless, caring about where you work does make a qualitative im-
pact on the nature of equilibrium. Consider equilibria in which domestic and
factory production coexist (corresponding to wealth-productivity parameters
(k;®) in region 5 or on B1). As the reader can easily verify, under the initial
speci…cation of preferences — where agents care about their workplace —
managers and workers are compensated for working in factories:11
q(W; g1) >q (W; g2) and q(M;g1) >q (M;g2)
In contrast, when agents do not care about their workplace, there are no
compensating di¤erentials:
q(W; g1)=q(W; g2) and q(M;g1)=q(M;g2)
Caring about where you work has other consequences as well. In Figure 2
the curve B1 slopes downward: the threshold level for shifting from domestic
to factory production decreases as economies acquire additional wealth for
building the factories. This re‡ects the e¤ect of indivisibilities at the plant
level. Each factory requires 6 units of commodity 1 as input; as k increases,
this indivisibility matters less and less.
In Figure 1, on the other hand, B1 has an upward slope. With greater
wealth, economies require more productivity from factories to compensate for
inferior working conditions, and this trumps the in‡uence of indivisibility.
More subtly, in Figure 1 the separation between curves B1 and B2 remains
11Interpretation: workers do not like the regimen of factory life; managers have to appear
on the factory ‡oor to monitor, whereas with domestic production monitoring is not as
demanding. This is simply an interpretation. One of the virtues of our approach is that
what goes on inside a …rm does not have to be modeled explicitly. Of course, it would be
very interesting to connect our approach to the extensive literature on …rm organization
in which the monitoring and team production technology is main quite explicit. But that
is for another time.









but in Figure 2 these curves converge:
lim
k!1
B1(k)= l i m
k!1
B2(k)=3
In the latter case, the gap disappears as the di¤erence in material input
cost between factory and domestic production becomes negligible relative to
per capita wealth. But in the former case, where agents care about where
they work, not only the cost of material inputs but also the cost of workers
and of managers di¤ers between domestic …rms and factories. In contrast to
material inputs, the di¤erence in the cost of human resources does not be-
come negligible as wealth increases — wealthy agents demand better working
conditions.
5.3 Capitalists
In the preceding application no one owns a …rm. Capital, the material inputs
a manager and his workers require if they are to form a going concern, is
acquired from the “market,” not from any speci…c agent. In this application
we articulate a role for the “capitalist,” an agent who supplies capital to a
particular …rm.
All agents are ex ante identical with endowment e =( k;0).A s i n a p -
plication 6.2, we distinguish between workers and managers: ­ = fW; Mg.
There are two types of …rm. A …rm of type g1 is worker managed. There
are 3 workers, each contributing 1 unit of capital (commodity 1) as well as
his labor; the …rm is managed cooperatively without a formal “manager.”
Formally:
g1 =( ¼1;°1;y 1) ¼1 =( 3 ;0) y1 =( 0 ;3)
Firms of type g2 are owned and managed by an entrepreneur who supplies
all 3 units of the capital and also serves as a manager of two workers who
contribute nothing but their labor. Formally:
g2 =( ¼2;°2;y 2) ¼2 =( 2 ;1) y1 =( 0 ;®)
37Figure 3: Phase Diagram: Capitalists
Preferences are described by the utility function:
u(x;`)=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
8
p
x1x2 if the agent chooses no membership
6
q
(x1 ¡ 1)x2 if the agent chooses m =( W;g1)
6
q
(x1 ¡ 3)x2 if the agent chooses m =( M;g2)
4
p
x1x2 if the agent chooses m =( W;g2)
Workers prefer the working conditions of a worker-managed …rm, other
things being equal, but self-monitoring and joint supply of capital may be less
e¢cient than having a single owner who controls his workers. The parameter
® measures the relative e¢ciency of the entrepreneurial …rm.
Notice that, in contrast to the preceding example, …rms acquire no inputs
from the market. Instead capital is provided by the workers (in …rms of type
g1)o rb ya ne n t r e p r e n e u r( i n… r m so ft y p eg2), an obligation we build into
consumption sets. An agent choosing a membership (W;g1) is required to
38choose a nonnegative consumption vector (x1;x 2) such that x1 ¸ 1,a n dt h e
…rst unit consumed of commodity 1 contributes nothing to utility. Similarly,
an agent choosing a membership (M;g2) must consume at least 3 units of
commodity 1 and the …rst three units contribute nothing to utility.
As before, let ½0 denote the fraction of agents choosing no membership
and ½j t h ef r a c t i o nc h o o s i n gam e m b e r s h i pi na… r mo ft y p ej (j =1 ;2), and
normalize so that p1 =1 . We omit the computation of equilibrium, which
parallels that of Example 6.2. Figure 3, which subdivides the parameter
space
f(k;®) 2 R
2 j (k;®) > 0g
into a number of regions, captures the most important features of the equi-
librium correspondence. The curve labeled B1 is the graph of the equation
® = B1(k): =
( 9+7k




The curve labeled B2, which intersects the graph of B1 at the point
(k;®)=( 9 =2;27=5), is the graph of the equation
® = B2(k): =
5k ¡ 9
k ¡ 2
k ¸ 9=2 (9)
(Note that B2 is de…ned only for k ¸ 9=2.)
Below the curve minfB1;B 2g (Regions 2 and 3), where the productivity
of entrepreneurial …rms is low, there are no entrepreneurial …rms: agents
either belong to a worker-managed …rms or choose not to work. Above the
curve B1 (Regions 4 and 6), where the productivity of entrepreneurial …rms
is high, there are no worker-managed …rms: agents either are members of
entrepreneurial …rms or they choose not to work. On the curve B1 and,
for wealth k>9=2, in the area bounded by the curves B1 and B2,w o r k e r -
managed and entrepreneurial …rms coexist. Region 5, along with the curve
B1, is where worker-managed …rms and entrepreneurial …rms coexist.
For equilibria in this region, it would, at least in principle, be possible
to test for the presence of a trade-o¤ between “economic democracy” and
the e¢ciencies of a more hierarchically organized …rm. We are unaware of
any study of that sort comparable to Mokyr’s comparison of domestic and
factory production.
39This application has ruled out by …at the possibility of acquiring capi-
tal from the market. This seems reasonable since otherwise capitalists are
providing capital without insisting on control. How then would we propose
capturing the publicly-owned corporation? By recognizing that shareholders
are also members of the group, supplying capital but delegating control to a
board of directors. The advantage to such an investor is the opportunity to
diversify risk by holding relatively small stakes in many di¤erent …rms; the
disadvantage is the introduction of an agency problem. We leave such an
extension for another time.
5.4 Contracts
Here we give a simple example illustrating the interpretation of groups as
contracts and the e¤ect of competition on the choice of contracts.
We consider an economy in two dates 0;1. There is a single good (grain),
which can be consumed at either date but can also be planted at date 0. Two
methods of planting are possible:
a) Two agents can work side-by-side, planting 2 units of grain at date 0
and harvesting 2® units of grain. Because the agents work side-by-side,
they must share the harvest equally, obtaining ® units of grain each.
We refer to this arrangement as partnership.
b) Two agents can work in sequence, the …rst planting 2 units of grain
at date 0, the second harvesting ¯ units. Because the agents work in
sequence, the second agent cannot be prevented from eating the entire
harvest. We refer to this arrangement as ownership, to the second agent
as the entrepreneur and to the …rst agent as the worker.
We view each of these choices as indivisible and full-time, so each agent
can choose to participate in only one (or neither of course).12 We take output
levels ®;¯ as parameters.
12We might allow for part-time participation, or for smaller-scale planting, but this
would add substantial complication without adding much interest.
40Agents are ex ante identical. Agents are endowed with 4 units of grain




Aside from the contractual arrangements for planting grain, no intertemporal
contracts are enforceable; in particular, there is no market at date 0 for
consumption at date 1.
We model this story as an atemporal economy with one good, embedding
consumption in the second date into utility functions. Formally, we dis-
tinguish three membership characteristics P;E;W (partner, entrepreneur,
worker) and two group types





2 if ¯ = P
0 if ¯ = E
0 if ¯ = W





0 if ¯ = P
1 if ¯ = E
1 if ¯ = W
Consumption sets permit consumption of any non-negative quantity of
the (date 0) private good and choice of at most one membership. In this
formulation, utility for date 0 consumption and membership choice re‡ects












c ¢ (4 + ¯)
To solve for the equilibrium (which will depend on the productivity pa-
rameters ®;¯) we take the private good as numeraire. Budget balance entails





If membership prices are q, then the (indirect) utility of agents choosing
various memberships is
^ u(0) = 4
^ u(P;P)=
q






[4 ¡ q(E;O)][4 + ¯]
(An agent choosing a partnership will pay the price q(P;P), hence con-
sume 4 ¡ q(P;P) units of grain at date 0 and 4+® units of grain at date 1,
and so forth.)
Keep in mind that some of these memberships may not be chosen at
equilibrium. Indeed, the space of parameter values can be decomposed into
three (open) regions and their boundaries; within each region, only a single
kind of membership is chosen.
I In this region, neither partnership nor ownership are chosen. In order
that this be the case, the indirect utility ^ u(0) must be at least as large
as every other indirect utility. Simple algebra gives:
^ u(0) ¸ ^ u(P;P) , ® ·
4
3
^ u(0) ¸ ^ u(W; O) , q(W; O) ¸ 0
^ u(0) ¸ ^ u(E;O) , q(E;O) ¸
4¯
4+¯
42Keeping in mind that q(W;O)+q(E;O)=2and solving, we conclude
that this region is the rectangle bounded by
0 · ® ·
4
3
0 · ¯ · 4
II In this region only partnership is chosen. In order that this must be
the case, the indirect utility ^ u(P;P) must be at least as large as every
other indirect utility. Simple algebra gives:
^ u(0) · ^ u(P;P) , ® ¸
4
3




^ u(P;P) ¸ ^ u(E;O) , q(E;O) ¸
® +4+4 ( ¯ ¡ ®)
4+¯
Solving, we conclude that this region is in…nite above and to the right:






· ® · 4
¯ arbitrary for 4 <®
(If ®>4 t h e nt h e r ei sn ow a g er a t et h eo w n e rc a na ¤ o r dt op a yf r o m
endowment that will make the worker prefer working to being in a
partnership.)
III In this region, only ownership is chosen. This region is the complement
of the union of regions I, II and we can describe it as:






In this region, half the agents choose to be entrepreneurs and half
choose to be workers. Because ex ante identical agents obtain the








43Figure 4: Competitive Contracting
44Remember that negative membership prices are wages: the entrepreneur
pays the worker the wage
2¯¡8
8+¯ and bears the cost of planting.
It is instructive to contrast the competitive environment discussed above
to an environment in which there are only two agents. If there are only two
agents, there is no reason to view equilibrium as the appropriate solution
notion. Rather, it seems that we should permit as a solution any e¢cient,
individually rational con…guration.
Given a speci…ed transfer t from the entrepreneur to the worker, straight-
forward calculations (as above) let us compare ownership, partnership and
working alone.
(i) the worker prefers ownership to working alone if t>0









(iv) the entrepreneur prefers ownership to partnership if
t<
2¯ ¡ 3® ¡ 4
4+¯
From this, we can identify the regions in which various arrangements are
individually rational and e¢cient:
IV Ownership is individually rational and e¢cient if there is a transfer t
(from the entrepreneur to the worker) so that both the entrepreneur
and the worker prefer the relationship to working alone and at least
one of them prefers the relationship to partnership. Thus ownership
is individually rational and e¢cient if either: there exists a transfer t
for which (i), (ii) and (iii) are satis…ed, or there exists a transfer t for
45which (i), (ii) and (iv) are satis…ed. After a little algebra, we if there
is a transfer t for which (i), (ii) and (iv) are satis…ed then there is a
transfer for which (i), (ii) and (iii) are satis…ed, and that ownership is





V Partnership is individually rational if 3(4 + ®) > 16; equivalently, if
®>4
3. Partnership is e¢cient if there does not exist a transfer for
which both (iii) or (iv) are satis…ed. After a little algebra, we see that







Note that this region coincides with Region II above.
VI Working alone is individually rational and e¢cient only in the comple-
ment of the union of regions IV, V.
Figure 5 provides a sketch of these regions. Note that regions IV, V
overlap. In the intersection of these regions, both ownership and partnership
are individually rational and e¢cient contractual relationships — and either
m i g h tb ec h o s e ni naw o r l dw i t ho n l yt w oa g e n t s .H o w e v e r ,a sw eh a v es e e n
above, (except for parameters in a set of measure 0) only one contractual
arrangement survives in a competitive market.
46Figure 5: Bilateral Contracting
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